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NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS
Jay 0. Hunze
U. S. Energy Research and Development Administration
Chicago Operations Office

Abstract
Nuclear safeguards Is an Important Issue which bears on the poten
tial usage of nuclear energy as a viable electric power source and
an understanding of the Issues and problems Is necessary to resolve
this Issue. ERDA has a comprehensive and coordinated program
directed toward providing the necessary base, both informational
and hardware related, to resolve these issues.
Nuclear safeguards Is a current Issue

safeguards, why it has taken on added im

which will obviously bear on the potential

portance and what ERDA is doing in the

use of one of our energy resources.

safeguards area.

There

are serious questions being raised now

So that we all operate today from a common

with respect to this issue which must be

base, I would like to start by defining

addressed and brought to bear on critical

some terms.

decisions concerning fuel reprocessing,

initions.

use of mixed-oxide fuels and commerciali

These are text book-type def
The first definition by rights

is nuclear safeguards.

zation of the breeder reactor.
Nuclear Safeguards is a collective term
Nuclear safeguards, much like nuclear

that comprises those measures designed to

safety is a topic around which much emo

guard against the diversion of material as

tionalism is easily generated, charges

source and special nuclear material from

and counter charges are frequently made

uses permitted by law or treaty and to

and absolute assurances are not possible.

give timely indication of possible diver

As a result, an old question comes back

sion or credible assurance that no diver

to haunt us ... "How safe Is safe enough?"

sion has occurred.

This question can really only be answered
by an informed and knowledgeable public

Within that definition there are two terms

with a full understanding of all the con

which also need to be defined; source

sideration involved.

material and special nuclear material.

Since we do not

live in a riskless society, we must make

Source material is simply uranium which

a societal determination based on some

contains the mixture of isotopes occurring

form of a risk-benefit concept.

in nature, depleted uranium or thorium.

I do not propose today to try to tell you

Special nuclear material is uranium which

how to do that, but what I do want to do

has been enriched in either 233 or 235 and
plutonium.

is provide you with some understanding of

303

The nuclear safeguards definition also

nal dose that is less than 100 rems

uses the word measures.

per hour, at a distance of three

Measures may in

feet from any accessible surface

clude, but are not limited to:
(1)

Maintenance and verification of

without intervening shielding

records of receipt, shipments and

material.

periodic inventories

These quantities are derived from amounts

(2)

Physical protection

required for the fabrication of a nuclear

(3)

Reliability standards for indivi

explosive device.

duals having access to safe-guarded
Another term which has received a great

materials
(4)

deal of notoriety is material unaccounted

Inspection of nuclear facilities to

for or MUF.

provide assurance that no diversion
(5)
(6)
(7)

has occurred

Material Unaccounted For is the algebraic

Physical methods to detect or

difference between a physical inventory

measure loss of materials

and its concomitant book inventory after

Penal provisions to deter theft or

determining that all known removals (such

diversion

as accidental losses, normal operational

Reward provisions such as those

losses, and authorized write-offs) have

provided by the Atomic Weapons and

been reflected in the book inventory.

Special Nuclear Materials Rewards

One must be careful as to the meaning and

Act under Public Law 93-377

importance which is ascribed to any MUF

Another term commonly used in safeguards

value.

work Is strategic quantities.

or negative and can vary from time to

This is

MUF values can be either positive

also sometimes referred to as trigger

time as a result of accounting adjustments,

quantities or threshold quantities.

rounding differences, measurement tech
niques and simple arithmetic errors.

Strategic Quantities are:
A.

Book/Physical Inventory Difference, BPID,

Uranium 235 (contained in uranium

is probably more descriptive than MUF.

enriched 20 percent or more in

Nuclear safeguards are important because

uranium 235 isotope) alone, or in

B.

combination with plutonium and/or

from all current indications, nuclear

uranium 233, when (multiplying the

generated electricity is an energy option

plutonium and/or uranium 233 con

which is and will continue to be exercised

tent by 2.5) the total is 5,000

in the U.S. at least for the short-term

grams (5 kg's) or more.

future with many more nuclear generating

Plutonium 2 3 8 , 239 and 24l and/or

stations including breeder reactors.

uranium 233 when the plutonium

Furthermore, whether we like it or not,

and/or uranium 233 content is 2,000

nuclear energy as a world electric power

grams (2 kg's) or more.
C.

source is becoming a fact of life.

Uranium 235, plutonium 2 3 8 , 239

Over

thirty countries already have, or have be

241 and uranium 233 as specified

gin work on nuclear power reactors, and

in "A" and "B" above that is readi
ly separable from other radioactive
material and when the total radio

many others have some nuclear capability.
Regardless of what we do In the U.S.,
It is likely that world-wide nuclear

active material delivers an exter

energy will continue to grow as a power
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source until it can be economically re

could pose threats to nuclear plants and

placed by some alternate source such as

special materials.

solar or fusion.

performed on the vulnerability of facili
ties in the nuclear fuel cycle using a

As a result of this expanded use of nuclear

spectrum of possible overt and covert acts

fission energy, more and more enriched

of sabotage or diversion.

uranium and plutonium will become avail
able.

If one looks at the nuclear fuel cycle, it

Basic concern then stems from two

rather simple facts:

1.

Evaluations are being

is relatively easy to identify those

U and Pu are

materials from which very devastating ex

portions of the cycle where a practical

plosive devices can be fabricated; and

safeguards concern exists.

2.

the current light water reactor fuel cycle

Pu is a very toxic substance.

which has not yet closed itself through

The aforementioned facts are further am

the reprocessing stage actually presents

plified in importance since the passage of

little of practical safeguards concern

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,

from the initial mining step to the spent

which gave rise to the well known Atoms

fuel transportation and storage steps.

For Peace Program, and large quantities

While there are no practical safeguards

of privately-owned special nuclear mate

concerns based on the previous definition

rial of strategic value are now available
in the commercial sector.

where safeguards Is limited to theft or

Also, a great

diversion, It is recognized that there

deal of information on the principles of

are still real concerns in parts of the

nuclear weapon fabrication is readily
available due to a major effort in declass
ification.

As an example,

cycle about potential terrorist acts and
sabotage which must be addressed.

Coupled with these items,

terrorist activities have emerged in

Now as we close that cycle and add re

recent years on a dramatic scale through

processing and possible mixed oxide fuel

out the world.

usage we have significantly increased our
areas of practical safeguards concerns.

The Increase of terrorist and politically

If nuclear energy is to become a viable

militant acts not only in other countries

energy option we must close the fuel cycle

but in the U.S. too have resulted in a

and face these problems.

greater emphasis on research and develop
ment of special nuclear materials safe

In general, the policies and techniques

guards.

developed to protect nuclear material In

To guide its R and D program ERDA

one facility or shipment are applicable

has identified the following threats to

to protection of the same kind of nuclear

which its safeguards program is aimed:
1.

materials in other facilities or shipments.

Terrorist-type attacks involving

Physical protection systems, whether for a

theft and sabotage at facilities or

light water reactor or a fuel fabrication

during transit; and
2.

facility, employ the same elements and are

Thefts by knowledgeable employees

based on the same principles of defense-

or groups having legitimate access

in-depth, although the particular mix of

to special nuclear materials, or

elements will depend on the specific fac

persons having no authorized access.

ility, and the amount, form, and enrich
ERDA is conducting a comprehensive threat

ment of special nuclear material.

analysis study to identify motivation and

is little, if any, difference between the

capabilities of personnel and groups who
305

There

type and number of measurements needed to

lish vulnerability criteria and identify

account for the plutonium recycle and

possible consequences.

those for a liquid metal fast breeder
reactor fuel fabrication facility.

then possible counteratlons can be identi

Once this is done

fied and interactions between the two can

The general objective of the nation's

be modeled.

safeguards program, which is being sup

models is being validated by actual in-

ported by ERDA, is to prevent successful
unlawful acts involving nuclear materials

the-field testing performed at existing
ERDA facilities.

and facilities.

ERDA is continuing to tighten its own

This objective can be

The performance of these

met through an in-depth approach that

requirements for containment, control and

looks to:

accountability of SNM, concurrently with

1. deterring attempts, 2. mini

mizing possibilities of success, and 3.

the development of new measurement and

minimizing consequences.

physical security hardware and systems.

ERDA's approach to the safeguarding of

These involve use of portal monitors which

nuclear facilities and materials Is one

have been developed and are now commer

of a systematic analysis to determine the

cially available that can detect a gram or

most cost-effective measures that will

less of unshielded plutonium on a person

guard against the sabotage of nuclear

passing through the portal monitor.

More

facilities and/or the illegal removal of

sensitive and foolproof personnel and

nuclear material over a wide range of

package monitors are under development.

possible adverse actions.

Sensitive portable instruments have been

The goal is to

arrive at the design of an integrated

developed to search for nuclear materials

safeguards system for a specific class of
nuclear facility (for example, a fuel

tensive development and application is

in vehicles and other hiding places.

element fabrication plant or reprocessing

being made of on-line non-destructive

plant) that can be implemented and to In

assay methods, on-line inventory, and

stall the system in a commercial scale

highly automated and protected process

operation to demonstrate both Its safe

operations to minimize access to SNM.

Ex

guards, adequacy and Its cost effective

Process operations and vaults are being

ness.

designed to help deter theft and diversion

To achieve this goal, ERDA uses a

combination of employee trustworthiness

of SNM, and will incorporate alarms,

determination (security clearance), physi

warning systems, and tamper-safe features.

cal protection and material control and
accountability.

A systematic design of the total system,

For every class of facility a wide combi

highly automated high throughput process

interfacing with the requirements of a

nation of adversary actions is possible.

line operation, will achieve maximum pro

This requires the application of adversary

tection for a given investment.

path analysis to the facility class under

ment of design principles and criteria for
this system is underway now.

study.

Here the fundamental material

Develop

processing procedures and proposed plant

Since material in transport is recognized

siting design and construction features

to be inherently more vulnerable to theft,

are scrutinized and modeled against all

sophisticated systems have been designed

possible credible adversary actions

to protect it.

(covert-overt and combination) to estab

vehicles with armored cabs and trailers
306

These include safe, secure

with numerous protective and disabling

systems against terrorist acts or criminal

devices; armed escorts with orders to use

diversions.

ERDA hosts representatives

their weapons to prevent the theft of SNM,

from foreign countries in the U.S. for

point-to-point shipments with no loading

such tehnical exchanges.

or unloading between points, a nationwide

Minimizing the consequences of a theft or

communications system which enables truck

terrorist action involving special nuclear

occupants to call for help or automatical

material is another part of the system.

ly signal need for help In the event of an

Search and recovery of nuclear material

overt action, preferential routing, con

Is a joint ERDA and FBI responsibility.

tinuous surveillance, and preplanning to
assure delivery at a time when the receiv

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has
statutory responsibility for investigating

ing facility is available to accept ship

all alleged, suspected or actual criminal

ment .

violations of the Federal code.

This approach has been in use for some

would support the FBI with specialized

time in the nuclear weapons program and

technical assistance which includes

has been under continuous improvement.

special expertise and equipment.

All ERDA special nuclear materials ship

ERDA maintains an HQ (Washington) based

ERDA

ments which involve strategic quantities

staff which is considered the program

are being shipped this way.

division for the ERDA safeguards and

ERDA considers U.S. national security to

security program.

dictate that nuclear materials and facili

divided into nine elements or tasks which

ties, wherever they appear In the world,

are grouped into two 'major responsibili

should be effectively safeguarded against

ties areas.

malevolent acts.

SAFEGUARDS DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
Characterize threat
TASK I
Conceptual design, development,
TASK II

In terms of material

theft, such acts anywhere In the world
could pose a direct threat of nuclear
violence against U.S. or other cities of
the world.

TASK III

Their program scope is

They are:

and analysis
Technology, equipment, and

ERDA has two distinct safeguards activi

modular system development/test

ties directly related to International

and evaluation in operating

safeguards.

environment

The first is strong support
TASK IV

of IAEA safeguards and contribution to

Integrated system design (plant

their continued development and effective

specific)/installation and test

ness Improvement.

and evaluation in operating en

ERDA provides IAEA with

vironment

access to safeguards research and develop
addition, ERDA continues to offer and

SAFEGUARDS OPERATIONS
Assessments and Inspections
TASK V

provide technical experts to assist the

TASK VI

Personnel clearance program

IAEA whenever called upon.

TASK VII

Nuclear materials management

ment programs carried out in the U.S.

In

and safeguards system (NMMSS)

The second ERDA activity is a bilateral
activity whereby ERDA carries out detail
ed technical exchanges with other countries
developing nuclear power capability to

TASK VIII

International activities

TASK IX

Safeguards Analytical Laboratory
(New Brunswick Laboratory)

The safeguards design and development tasks

provide a basis for comparable protective
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relate to the sequential steps of solving

Biographical Sketch

safeguards problems in both a generic and
specific manner.

A 1961 graduate of the University of

All design and develop

Missouri at Rolla with a

ment tasks are conducted in view of neu

B.S. in Metal

lurgical Engineering-Nuclear Option.

tralizing efforts of any adversary or

He

then took one year of post graduate courses

adversaries.

(University of Missouri at Rolla) in

The products of the first four tasks are

Nuclear Engineering before accepting a

designed to develop, assess, and assure

position with the Atomic Energy Commission.

the availability of cost effective safe

After joining the AEC in 1962, he spent

guards systems for application to the com

four months taking additional graduate

mercial fuel cycles.

level courses at the International Insti

provide:

These efforts also

1. safeguards systems and tech

tute of Nuclear Science and Engineering

nology to allow improvement of ERDA facil

at the Argonne National Laboratory plus

ity safeguards; and 2. for the transfer to

five months working at Atomics Inter

industry of the equipment and systems de

national before returning to the Chicago

signs developed in the ERDA program.

Operations Office of the AEC as a Reactor

The second five tasks are all generally

Safety Engineer.

related to ERDA's own operations and fac

positions of Reactor Safety Engineer,

He worked in the various

ilities and will not be elaborated on here.

Assistant Director and Deputy Director of
the Chicago Operations Office Safety Div

ERDA's safeguards budget has Increased

ision until March of this year when he

from $84.2 million in PY 1975 to $127.6

became Director of the Safeguards and

million in FY 1976 and $160.2 million in
FY 1977-

Security Division at the Chicago Office.

These monies not only provide

for improvement of safeguards measures at

Present responsibilities include the

ERDA facilities, but acceleration of ef

nuclear safeguards, security and materials

forts toward an integrated concept of

management for those operations under the

safeguards for the power reactor fuel

cognizance

cycle.

Office of the U.S. ERDA.

Further increases are anticipated

as this research and development proceeds
to a full scale demonstration of various
systems for typical classes of facilities.
It is ERDA's plan to keep safeguards tech
nology under continuing review for the
purpose of optimizing cost effectiveness
and maintaining an up-to-date capability
and technology base in this important
area.

^

Nuclear Energy and National Security,
A Statement by the Research and
Policy Committee of the Committee
for Economic Development, September,
1976.
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of the Chicago Operations

